DDASaccident296 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
2-15-2000
DDASaccident296
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident296" (2000). Global CWD Repository. 496.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/496
DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/04/2006 Accident number: 296 
Accident time: 08:25 Accident Date: 15/02/2000 
Where it occurred: Ploughshare minefield, 
Mozambique border 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: 21/02/2000 
ID original source: JM Name of source: Mounser/AVS 
2001:Z01 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
A limited accident report was made available by the programme manager in January 2001. 
The report provided was not an original document. Documents of any kind were only provided 
by this demining group in 2001 after pressure had been applied through the funder. To try to 
counter any omissions in the reports provided, statements were also taken from a field 
1 
supervisor and the doctor who treated the victims in March 2001. The following summarises 
the content of the documents provided and includes detail added by the other sources. 
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in one-man teams using a one-
man drill [from the start of 2000 this drill was adopted]. In this a single deminer looks for 
tripwires, cuts undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates finds. The group issued frontal 
protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while excavating. 
The victim was part of a “Survey Team” which was investigating the boundaries of a 
reinforcement (a belt of additional mines laid at random between the maintenance road and 
the first “A” row of mapped mines). The reinforcement had been “reported by local 
inhabitants”. Following the patterns expected in the ploughshare minefield, the strip of ground 
being surveyed was not expected to be mined. It was later found that the reinforced area 
extended further than the site of the accident. 
Wearing his visor and armour apron, the victim swept the ground with his detector and 
noticed no signal. He then got up to cut vegetation and, at 0825 hours, detonated an R2M2 
mine by stepping on it. “He sustained traumatic high velocity blast amputation of the right foot 
with sparing of the ipsilateral ankle joint. He also sustained first degree burns to the right 
arm”. The site supervisor corrected this to “part of” his right foot being amputated. 
The victim was evacuated from the accident site by a medic immediately and was attended by 
the Site Doctor within five minutes. He was transported in the “backup ambulance” (a 
Landrover) to Karanda Mission Hospital. “At the hospital, successful surgery was conducted 
with the right foot being amputated at ankle height”. Two days later “the Doctor noticed an 
unexpected drop in oxygen saturation and the patient died later that night. From an X-ray 
picture taken that evening, the surgeon concluded that the cause of death was Aspiration 
Pneumonia”. 
“A subsequent accident investigation showed that the centre of the blast was on the edge of 
the clearing lane. The depth of the crater suggested that the mine was buried at least 16 
centimetres deep and not easily detectable by the detectors in common use [Vallon]. That the 
mine was located on the edge of the lane and that it was buried so deep might have 
contributed to it being missed.” 




Victim number: 376 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 2 hours 5 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief medical report made out by the site doctor was obtained. This stated that the victim 
suffered “traumatic amputation of his right foot”.  
Field treatment involved: 
“Pressure bandaging R foot 
Fluid replacement with Ringers Lactate solution IV 
Bentyl [sp?] penicillin antibiotic 1 [illegible] 5ml 
ATT 0.5 ml  1ml, Pethizine [Sp?] 100mg 1 ml” 
The victim was evacuated to Karanda hospital leaving at 09:00 and arriving at 10:30. He was 
in the operating theatre from 11:00 – 14:00. The surgical procedure was a “definitive surgical 
amputation of right foot”. 
On “Day Two post-operative” the victim was “stable, ambulatory”. 
An addendum notes: “Patient in acute respiratory distress on Thurs 17/02/2000, demising on 
same day around 22:00 hrs”. 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management Control inadequacy” because 
the preliminary survey of local people indicated that the area was mined. The Survey team 
then went mine-hunting without using clearance drills or marking systems. This was an 
inappropriate method of “reducing” the suspect area by “Survey” and implies inadequate 
training and preparation. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was edited prior to being 
made available. And because only a limited summary was made available. 
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